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This paper presents a security analysis of the online banking system of
one of the most important banks of the Netherlands. New security devices
have been designed in order to authorize transactions in a handy and user-
friendly way. In doing so, it has been attempted to strengthen the online
authentication system using hand-held smartcard readers connected by a
USB-cable to a PC. These USB-connected smartcard readers are devices
with a small display and numeric keyboard with two additional keys in
order to accept or deny operations. The customers of Internet banking can
perform any operation in a ”secure way” with such devices.
In this document we will discuss different USB-connected smartcard readers
from several Dutch banks. For ABN-AMRO we will discuss the smartcard
reader called the e.dentifier2 made by Gemalto, which we will principally
focus on it in more detail, and for ING the reader DigiPass 850, made by
VASCO.
We will focus on reverse engineering the ABN-AMRO’s readers. We will
verify that last attack [1] on those devices is not working in the new version
of the e.dentifier2 and we will also reverse engineer some additional func-
tionalities,which were not considered in earlier research about ABN-AMRO
e.dentifier2 reverse engineering [2], and currently do not seem to be used in
ABN-AMRO’s internet banking website. These additional functionalities
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1.1 Smartcard readers for Internet banking
Some important banks in the Netherlands are using new security devices in order to
strengthen the authentication process with their customers. As usual, any bankcard
always requires a PIN code as the essential authentication method in any transaction
with the bank. However, banks are establishing new security policies, which try to offer
more security in the challenges generated mainly by 3 factors: cardholders interaction,
bankcard and own smartcard reader of the bank. In these cases the cardholder can
log into the bank, sign payments, send transactions, generate secure codes and so on.
Banks are attempting to give cardholders more insight into detail of transactions and
involve them more in them.
Secondly, we will discuss two versions of ABN-AMRO USB-connected smartcard
reader. We will talk about an older version and a newer one of the e.dentifier2. With
the older version of e.dentifier2, a new security feature was presented as its main aim:
”What You Sign Is What You See”(WYSWYS). This new signing method lets users
can understand what they are signing with their devices in a friendly way. However,
this was totally proven false in the paper ”Design to Fail: A USB-Connected Reader
for Online Banking” [1], where a design flaw in the protocol was exposed, where an
infected PC clearly could give the go-ahead without waiting for the user to press ′OK ′.
This flaw could allow the computer to choose transaction details and then carry out a
bank transfer without confirmation by the end user. After this failure was discovered,
readers could not be patched and ABN-AMRO got in touch with their supplier in order
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to develop a new version of e.dentifier2.
Thirdly, we will talk in detail about DigiPass 850, an ING USB-connected smartcard
reader made by the vendor VASCO. This smartcard reader seems to be a new version
of USB-unconnected DigiPass 800 but now this model can work with USB connection
and without. We know that DigiPass 850 was showcased with the Belgian e-ID around
2004 and we guess that it is used for inside payments. According to the vendor this
device ”has multiple authentication methods as one-time passwords (OTP) and PKI
infrastructure” and it is used with its own software called VACMAN.
Core objectives of this paper will be to investigate if they fixed the problem with the
new version of e.dentifier2 and continue the reverse engineering with readers previously
mentioned. Mostly we will focus on the e.dentifier2 where some functions of its plugin
are still of unknown use and they will be investigated from a low-level overview in
some detail. These functions are known in EMV-CAP specifications [6] as Mode1 and
Mode2 and they are used for authentication in transactions although they are secret.
Nowadays we do not see these functions interact with the plugin, but they could be
activated in the future. We will analyze different protocols used in communications




In order to make the following chapters easier to follow, we will give some background
on the EMV and EMV-CAP standards and some details about challenges-responses or
one-time passwords. Moreover we will take a look how the USB protocol works. Also
we will have a look at step-by-step several operations like login and send transactions
using the USB-connected and unconnected mode of the e.dentifier2. This chapter is
also offering important information on the main goal of the e.dentifier2, ”What You
Sign Is What You See”, which is trying to avoid fraud in e-banking.
2.1 ”Sign What You See”(SWYS)
A challenge-response authentication protocol is a security protocol that verifies an
identity with a response to a challenge. This challenge is issued by a sender, which
usually consists of a totally unpredictable random number, also known as nonce, and
from this nonce the receiver must answer with a nonce and something else that shows
who he really is. There are lots of different types of challenge-response authentication
processes in the real world, but specifically in Internet banking, those nonces are random
numbers of 8 digits with ABN-AMRO. If our bank wants us to authenticate, it will send
a challenge to us and we will copy this number in the smartcard reader in addition to a
PIN code and our smartcard reader will generate a response to this challenge; therefore




The digital signature is an operation where a transaction is authorized or confirmed;
the way to do this is by using these challenges-responses. Digital signatures can be
done by cardholders, authorizing payments, or by smartcards giving responses towards
the e.dentifier2 in order to verify the right way in the last operation computed by
the smartcard. This data is signed using asymmetric cryptography, but they also use
symmetric cryptography in order to generate MAC (Message Authentication Code).
Those codes are evidence to verify the source of messages. Smartcards and banks
know those symmetric keys (usually 3DES keys). The main goal is that the cardholder
can control the signing of transactions in a handy way. For that a new feature was
included in the e.dentifier2, called by the vendors: ”What You Sign Is What You
See” (WYSIWYS), also called ”Sign What You See”(SWYS). This technique tries to
prevent Man-in-the-Browser attacks. Those attacks infect web browsers in order to
evilly modify transactions in the host. Due to those attacks, USB-connected smartcard
readers can be more secure because the smartcard reader displays transaction details
that the cardholder can understand and decide if he wants to accept or deny it, so the
cardholder does not just see meaningless random numbers. So apparently it would be
more difficult to exploit these sorts of attacks with this new USB-connected design.
This new system tries to defeat Man-in-the-Browser attacks definitively.
2.2 The USB Protocol
In this section we will discuss background information about the USB protocol quickly
in order to better understand some later sections. First of all, we can say that USB
devices are classified as a hub or a function. Hubs provide additional attachment points,
whereas functions provide capabilities to the system. In a USB system we can highlight
3 main parts:
• USB Host. There only exists one in the system. A USB host has a root hub
which offers more ports. A cardholder will be able to connect the e.dentifier2 to
any free port of the USB host (PC of the cardholder).
• USB interconnect. This provides a connection from USB device(s) to USB Host.
• USB devices (hub or function). A hub simply offers additional ports, and a
function offers capabilities to the system. The e.dentifier2 will be a USB device
4
2.2 The USB Protocol
connected to this hub in order to provide e-banking services to customers of
ABN-AMRO.
A USB communication is created between these parts creating a data flow. In this
communication we can also highlight some parts such as:
• Endpoints. They are unique addressable points in devices. This endpoints have
different characteristics like frecuency, latency, bandwith, number identifier, trans-
fer type and so on. They can be In/Out depending on its direction. ”In” is from
the USB device (e.dentifier2) to the USB Host (PC). ”Out” is from USB host to
the USB device.
• Pipes. These are associating endpoints with the USB host. They are the way to
communicate USB host and endpoints.
Briefly, we can have a look at the four basic transfer types:
• Control. These lossless transmissions are used for the configurations.
• Bulk data . Sequential lossless transmissions are used to transfer a large amount
of data.
• Interrupt data . Transmissions need priority over others. Typically, a mouse or
pointers.
• Isochronous data . Transmissions for streaming data. This can have loss but also
have priority on the USB bus.
The e.dentifier2 is a USB device and a USB host can be the cardholder’s computer.
The e.dentifier2 will be able to create communications over USB-cable thanks to end-
points, where it will be sent data over pipes in both directions (In/Out). This means
e.dentifier2 to PC and vice versa. Mostly in the cases of the USB traffic, which has




EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard and Visa. EMV is the standard used for bank-
ing smartcards. In this standard is defined in detail the interaction at the physical,
electrical, data and application levels between banking smartcards and terminals (eg.
ATMs and point-of-sale terminals).
2.4 EMV-CAP
The Chip Authentication Program (CAP) is a specification for using EMV banking
smartcards for Internet banking. It started as an initiative of MasterCard, and later
for Visa. This specification defines a handheld device, also known as CAP reader or
EMV-CAP reader, with a smartcard slot and a numeric keypad capable of displaying
between 8 and 12 characters.
In EMV-CAP, when the user signs an operation from a EMV-CAP reader, a couple
of cryptograms are created as proof of authorization by the smartcard. Those cryp-
tograms are called Application Cryptograms (AC) and we can distinguish the following:
• ARQC (Authorization Request Cryptogram). This is the response from smartcard
against the challenge sent by the e.dentifier2.
• AAC (Application Authentication Cryptogram). This second cryptogram is a step
more in order to correctly complete the transaction.
Although EMV is not public it has frequently been reverse engineered [5], specifi-
cally the EMV-CAP standard used in the e.dentifier2 is still unknown. Some internal
functions are creating a kind of ”black box” with data, which are totally ”mangled” in
the output.
2.5 e.dentifier2
In this section we will discuss ABN-AMRO’s reader, also known as the e.dentifier2,
which is a hand-held smartcard reader that has a small display and numeric keyboard
with two additional keys in order to accept or deny operations. This device can work in
USB-connected or unconnected mode. However, we will just focus on USB-connected
mode in this paper.
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It seems that several versions have been released. For finding out the information
which version is running in the device we just keep the key ≪ 5 ≫ held in the keypad
and insert any smartcard. We think that there are only two versions of e.dentifier2 but
we do not know how many versions are running nowadays. Specifically in this paper
we are working with the two following versions:
• e.dentifier2 F/W 01.02 H/W C Dec 19 2007 18:39:42 . This will be called old
version or old e.dentifier2 in this document.
• e.dentifier2 F/W 01.05 H/W C Feb 07 2012 14:54:39 . This will be called new
version or the improved e.dentifier2 in this document.
The manufacturers of the smartcard reader of ABN-AMRO claim the e.dentifier2
is ”the most secure sign-what-you-see end-user device ever seen” 1. In this document
we will discuss this.
2.5.1 Connected mode
In this section we deal with two operations: login and signing transaction. Any trans-
action can be done if the cardholder is previously logged in. In a login, the e.dentifier2
will reply with a response in order to be able to login to the website. In a transaction,
a challenge and response will play a role in the operation on both sides of the commu-
nication. Those operations will be outlined in the following point. They were already
explained in detail in other research [2].
2.5.1.1 Login
The cardholder wants to log into the Internet banking system using e.dentifier2 con-
nected over USB-cable. Hence, these are the main steps:
1. Cardholder plugs his e.dentifier2 into a free USB port in his system.
2. If the driver is not installed then the cardholder installs e.dentifier2 drivers 2 in
his system. A plugin is installed in the web browser and other files to recognize
the USB-reader in the operativing system.
1http://www.gemalto.com/financial/ebanking/about/case_studies/ABN_AMRO.html
2Drivers available only for Windows and MacOS systems
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3. Cardholder inserts bankcard into e.dentifier2.
4. Cardholder visits login ABN-AMROs website.
5. Web browser starts an SSL-TLS session between bank and cardholder PC.
6. Bank website reads the account number from the smartcard using JavaScript
program called BECON.js1. This is also checking if a card is inserted and if the
e.dentifier2 is ready. A couple of functions in this Javascript program will be
called: CheckConnection() and CheckCard() 2 .
7. If everything is right, e.dentifier2 asks the cardholder for PIN code
8. Cardholder types PIN code in the e.dentifier2.
9. E.dentifier2 lets the smartcard verify the PIN code for this account number.
10. If the PIN code is okay, the e.dentifier2 returns a response to the website.
11. The bank verifies if the responses match because it calculates its own response.
12. If the responses match, then the cardholder is logged in.
2.5.1.2 Signing transaction
The cardholder wants to make a transaction in the Internet banking system using
e.dentifier2 connected over USB-cable. Hence, these are the main steps:
1. Cardholder is already logged in.
2. Cardholder wants to make a payment in the website and he orders the transaction
in a web form.
3. The JavaScript program, BECON.js, calls to GetResponse(p sSignData) where
the input is data with details of the transaction by the bank. This data is sent
to e.dentifier2 over USB traffic.
4. The e.dentifier2 asks the cardholder for PIN code
1https://www.abnamro.nl/en/logon/generic/scripts/BECON.js
2These functions will be commented further in the next chapter.
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5. Cardholder types PIN code in the e.dentifier2.
6. E.dentifier2 lets the smartcard verify the PIN code for this account number.
7. If the PIN code is okay, then the e.dentifier2 shows a text in the display’s screen
with the amount received by the bank, where the cardholder can be accepted or
denied the transaction in the display of the e.dentifier2 pressing ’OK’ or ’C’ ,
which means Cancel.
8. If the user presses ’OK’, the e.dentifier2 sends a cryptogram to the smartcard using
a challenge-response with SignData, the smartcard also returns a cryptogram that
is converted for the e.dentifier2 in a response. This response is sent to the bank
as proof of the fact that user want to accept this transaction.
9. The bank can verify if responses match because it calculates its own response.
10. If they are identical, then the payment is carried out.
2.5.2 Unconnected mode
We will also discuss the unconnected mode, but it is not really relevant for this thesis.
The cardholder wants to log into the Internet banking system using unconnected
e.dentifier2. Hence, these are the main steps:
1. Cardholder visits login ABN-AMROs website.
2. Cardholder inserts card and account number.
3. Web browser starts an SSL-TLS session between bank and cardholder PC.
4. A JavaScript code called BECON.js is checking if card and account number exits
and are correct.
5. If everything is right, ABN-AMRO starts a challenge-response, and the website
shows a challenge in the web browser.
6. Cardholder inserts bankcard into e.dentifier2 and presses login key.
7. E.dentifier2 asks to the cardholder for PIN code.
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8. Cardholder types PIN code in the e.dentifier2.
9. E.dentifier2 internally checks PIN code for this account number.
10. If PIN code is okay, e.dentifier2 shows the response number.
11. Cardholder enters this response in the ABN-AMROs website.
12. Cardholder is logged in.
2.6 DigiPass 850
Other banks like ING Direct have also designed USB-connected readers. The company
VASCO was responsible for creating these readers for ING. In this paper we started
to research the version DigiPass 850 1. Nowadays these readers are not applied yet in
the real life for regular ING customers but they seem to be used for business payments 2.
A main aim for ING is also to prevent the PIN code leakage over PC or internet
like ABN-AMRO tried when they made its reader. Also it tries to achieve a more user
friendly mode, avoiding having to type bank account numbers, challenges and so on.
The manufacturer VASCO remarks the use of DIGIPASS: ”a propietary system of two-
factor authentication in the cloud”, as new feature of these devices. In this document
we have attempted to find out how USB communications work in these devices and






In this section we are going to talk about every tool that we used to achieve information
about the system. It is very important if we have a big picture about scenario. Therefore
let’s have a look in the following picture to understand better next discussions:
Figure 3.1: Real scenario - Big picture about possible eavesdropping points
3.1 USBTrace
This program was easy, comfortable and quick to use because you could watch raw USB
traffic in a single packets. After using this program, USB commands findings were very
useful to write our own driver to replay USB bulk data over e.dentifier2. We noticed
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that all packets were multiple of 8. So communication is always multiple of 8 bytes.
It was used to eavesdrop USB raw traffic from DigiPass 850 and it was observed
multiple of 6 bytes. Due to using other system to interact with the smartcard reader,
not many USB commands have been retrieved.
This tool was run in a Windows machine.
3.2 Wireshark
To sniff USB communications we also use Wireshark. The Operating System and this
tool ”convert” the raw USB packets into the network traffic. So it works as a network
interface. In addition a special configuration is required if we want to properly intercept
USB packets and it is that we need at least libpcap 1.0.0 in our machine. It was another
overview about USB taffic, with much more information that USBTrace. Fortunately
this tool can be launched in console mode (tshark) using filters to automate the research.
For instance, some filter like this was used for capturing USB commands:
usb.capdata && usb.endpoint number==2 && usb.device address
Being ”2” the numerical identifier of the endpoint of the e.dentifier2 and the field ’cap-
data’ contains information about the USB traffic.
It was used to find out USB commands in a Linux and Windows machine.
3.3 RebelSim & Realterm
This hardware interface allowed the passive monitoring of data between the e.dentifier2
and the smartcard. This kit is offered like ”Scanner tool of APDU commands from
GSM/UMTS Simcard for Analysis” and it was used with RealTerm software 1. Any
smartcard can be exposed to Man-in-the-Middle if we are able to achieve its baud rate.
Some previous steps were configured in order to sniff APDU commands. The baud rate




in a text file. [2]
Once we got raw APDU buffer and with help of EMV specifications, we were able to
discover the applet ID (AID),SELECT operations, GENERATE AC and their payloads
and traces. They will be discussed in the next chapter.
It was used to find out APDU traffic in a Windows machine.
3.4 JavaCard bankcard
The JavaCard smartcards allow applets (Java Applications) to be run securely on
smartcards. These smartcards are based on the Java Card Platform specifications de-
veloped by Sun Microsystems and they can be programmed using JavaCard API. When
a smartcard is inserted in the e.dentifier2, it will try select certain applet ID (AID).
This AID is hard-coded in the device and it is first EMV operation together with get
ATR 1. ABN-AMRO’s AID was found out using RealTerm being able to develop our
own applet2 with identical AID. Some functions were disabled as : PIN verification or
Application Transaction Counter (ATC).
We used these kind of smartcards:
• JCOP41 V2.3.1, SmartCard 72 Kbyte EEPROM, Dual Interface [7].
With these smartcards was possible to emulate a real card and it was used to achieve
replaying attacks and other functions in the e.dentifier2.
3.5 Firebug
As we know, the e.dentifier2 is connected over USB cable to host PC. This host PC
needs a web browser in order to communicate with the Bank website. This web browser
is using a JavaScript file when user’s PC is visiting logon Bank website. Through those
JavaScripts functions, it will be possible to start a communication. This Javascript code
will be responsible to verify bank account number with the bank, if the e.dentifier2 is
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Answer_to_reset
2 Proof of concept of an EMV applet simulating an ABN-AMRO card by Joeri de Ruiter [1].
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connected, if the connection is correct, version of driver and plugin and so on.
We noticed that a HTML embedded object 1 was working as plugin to communicate
with the e.dentifier2, this object was responsible to intercept requests and send them
to smartcard reader and it sends the response back.
It was very useful to use a Javascript debugger to find out some USB instructions
and the order of operations. It was used Mozilla Firefox with the Firebug Add-on
installed in it. The JavaScript file that was debugged, BECON.js, resides in the Bank
website but it is loaded in user’s web browser.
Further information about these JavaScript functions will be discussed later.(Chapter 5)
3.6 Own webpage
In order to make reverse engineering of some JavaScript functions was created our own
HTML page, which called to JavaScript functions of BECON.js to retrieve information.
Our own HTML page was combined with a couple of tools mentioned previously. First
of all, we loaded our own HTML page to run these JavaScript functions and we activated
these tools : USBTrace eavesdropping the USB commands with the e.dentifier2 and
RealTerm sniffing APDU traffic with smartcards. This way makes sure a complete
session how the information is being encapsulated with different protocols.
As we explained before in the introduction, this web page was created to find
out how GetMode1Response and GetMode2Response were internally working. These
functions are defined in EMV-CAP standard [6] although their specifications are secret,
so we think they are executed to do authentication and signing transactions using
cryptograms. With this web page we were able to send our crafted input values and
investigate further.
Although we were focused on two functions, the rest of functions were also im-
plemented in our own web page. We could observe how every function worked using
Firebug, USBTrace and RealTerm at the same time.
Further information in the reverse engineering section.(Chapter 5)





A couple of Virtual Machines were used to manage those tools. We did not choose last
Operating Systems due to the fact that we do not need them in order to achieve our
goals in reverse engineering. Two Operating Systems well-known are Ubuntu 10.04LTS
and the old Windows XP sp3.
3.7.1 Ubuntu 10.04LTS 32 bits
It was also important use a Linux system for using Wireshark in mode USB-sniffing.
Python code was run in Linux system because it is more comfortable than Windows
for these purposes even because libraries to create our own USB driver: liusb and
PyUSB were not stable yet in Windows. These libraries were uninstalled and installed
manually to get a stable environment. For instance, libusb and PyUSB were updated
to the last version avoiding repositories of the Operating System. Moreover libpcap,
a library to intercept traffic in the Operating System, was updated to libpcap 1.3.0 to
manage Wireshark with USB sniffing support.
3.7.2 Windows XP sp3 32 bits
It was very important to use a Windows system for e.dentifier2’s drivers. We know
that drivers are only available for MacOS and Windows systems. But thinking of in-
terception of USB traffic with Wireshark, I preferred using Windows because MacOS
didn’t have any reference at Wireshark Wiki1. Moreover this machine was also used to
realize Man-in-the-Middle between e.dentifier2 and smartcard, in this case the software
RealTerm was used with the following hardware: ”RebelSim APDU scanner”.Finally
a lot of time was spent using Windows so it were installed the libraries PyUSB and
libusb-win32 in order to use all in the same machine.
So it was able to get the following actions with this machine:
• Logging and eavesdropping at ABN-AMRO with USB-connected reader with
Javacards.




were important to understand some actions with other commands or APDU-
commands sent from the smartcard.
• Replaying USB-traffic with PyUSB.
Thanks to a proof of concept written in Python code 1, it was able to attack
the main goal of e.dentifier2 [1] , SWYS (”Sign What You See”). This proof of





A important question is now treated :
What will it happen with new version of e.dentifier2? How did they fix this
big problem?
4.1 Background : Old attack
As we explained before in the introduction, the main goal of the design of SWYS
protocol(”Sign What You See”) in the old e.dentifier2 was principally provide to clients
more security in operations. For that, their own reader would be a right solution in
order to defeat any kind of Man-in-the-browser or clientside attacks. This protocol was
designed wrongly and it was widely reverse engineered [1] finding a critical design error.
This flaw was that the e.dentifier2 sent a message to PC informing that the cardholder
had pressed ’OK’ (Step 7 in the diagram 4.1 SWYS protocol). This is clearly incorrect
because an infected PC could press OK itself and inmediately generate a cryptogram
(Step 8 in the diagram 4.1 SWYS protocol) accepting the transaction. In this way, the
main goal the e.dentifier2 was violated because the cardholder was unable to decide for
the transaction. Below we can have a look at SWYS protocol, diagram 4.1, and the
critical error is highlighted with bold.
The e.dentifier2 never had to communicate the user action of pressing OK. The
e.dentifier2 should have been designed to detect when the cardholder was really pressing
OK and in this moment, when cardholder pressed OK, then ask to smartcard for a
17
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cryptogram. In this way would achieve main goal of SWYS protocol protecting to the
cardholder of a PC infected with malware.
Figure 4.1: SWYS protocol. - Diagram for login and transactions in the old e.dentifier2 [1].
4.2 How was fixed the vulnerability? : New e.dentifier2
Once that ABN-AMRO watched the severity of this problem, their manufacturer de-
signed a new e.dentifier2 fixing the vulnerability. This new e.dentifier2 has been tested
against this attack[1] again. Now, the new e.dentifier2 knows if the user really pressed
OK or not. Verifying an internal state into the e.dentifier2 which show if it was pressed
by the cardholder. This internal state was not checked in the old version of e.dentifier2.
A simple error that was not detected in testings being maybe, the most obvious attack
in the SWYS protocol. We do not know if such internal state existed or not anytime
in the old e.dentifier2 and it was not used or it was simply forgotten.
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4.2 How was fixed the vulnerability? : New e.dentifier2
This new version asks to PC for generating a cryptogram to start a challenge-
response but the e.dentifier2 is able to recognize if the cardholder pressed OK himself.
Actually, the new version aborts any following operation if this internal state does not
show that the cardholder signed the transaction with OK. This means, if we observe
this patch in the following messages (Steps: 7 and 8 at diagram 4.2), that the e.dentifier
is now able to recognize if such internal state has been activated to go ahead with the
transaction, otherwise it will always take the default mode to abort a operation: Can-
cellation (Caldholder pressed OK). This default mode is also activated for a timeout in
the e.dentifier2. This timeout will be activated, for instance, if the cardholder forgets
his e.dentifier2 with the displayed text in the screen waiting OK/C for the user.
Figure 4.2: Attack to SWYS protocol. - Diagram for the attack on the new
e.dentifier.
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The following diagram 4.3 could have been a proper design of SWYS protocol in
the old e.dentifier to defeat whatever attack of this sort. Unfortunately the new design
of patched SWYS protocol was established in the new version after 5 years being vul-
nerable (As we discussed a couple of versions between 2007-2012). So far, we have not
found more attacks in this protocol, but it should be analyzed further. An improved
version of SWYS protocol could have been if the e.dentifier2 does not send a message
to PC confirming that the cardholder pressed OK. So, we know the e.dentifier2 has an
internal state, which shows if OK was pressed by user or not. Therefore, steps 7,8 in
Diagram 4.1 or 4.2 should have completely been disabled. The PC does not need to
know if the user pressed OK or not yet. Hence, below we offer a possible improved de-
sign of SWYS protocol. Unfortunately, this new design could not be deployed because
old e.dentifier2 had to keep working despite vulnerability.




Reverse engineering of additional
functionality
In this section we will discuss protocols with a low level overview. We will sum up
all USB instructions that we found on the both e.dentifiers. But also we will observe
possible traces of USB traffic depending of the kind of EMV card, cardholder’s deci-
sion to accept or deny transactions, changing input values in transactions in order to
investigate what is happening and so on.
We will focus on two unknown functions and probably not used nowadays, which
were not reverse engineered in the others research [1-2]. This functions were found in
JavaScript program resident in ABN-AMRO website as we explained earlier. These
functions could be used in order to login and sign transactions. Both functions will be
named as GetMode1Response and GetMode2Response. Every function or trace will be
discussed below or above of its corresponding table. Some tips will be explained later
to understand the following traces of USB traffic.
5.1 Cheat sheet USB commands-responses
To be able to follow better this research, a summary of USB commands and responses
can be checked along this document anytime. Some USB traffic has not been reverse
engineerd yet, although we think that it has not been relevant to understand core aims
of protocols.
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Table 5.1: Cheat sheet of USB commands in the e.dentifier2
The following table lists USB commands sent to the smartcard. Let us realize as just first
4 bytes are constructing the USB command. Some functions were not clear enough to give
a description.
USBcommand Description
00 02 6E 6C 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE NL(6E6C)
00 02 65 6E 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE EN(656E)
02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 GET ATR
02 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 SHOW SHIELD IN DISPLAY
02 0B 00 00 00 00 00 00 Channel is ready?? Detected after functions
01 03 01 02 00 00 00 00 SHOW PICTOGRAM : INSERT CARD
01 03 02 00 00 00 00 00 Card inserted??? Detected in CheckConnection
01 03 03 00 00 00 00 00 ??UNKNOWN Detected in CheckCard
01 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 ASK PIN
01 03 05 05 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-DATA-login
01 03 05 16 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-DATA-transaction
01 03 05 46 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-TEXT to display
01 03 06 00 00 00 00 00 GENERATE CRYPTOGRAM
01 03 07 01 00 00 00 00 GETMODE2RESPONSE login
01 03 07 17 00 00 00 00 GETMODE1RESPONSE transaction
01 03 08 15 00 00 00 00 LAST LOGIN MESSAGE ? Guess
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Table 5.2: Cheat sheet of USB responses in the e.dentifier2
The following table lists USB responses from smartcard to e.dentifier2. Let us realize as
just first 4 bytes are constructing the USB responses. Also we can watch the payload
attached to commands, where it is marked with XX can go different values depending of
data.
USBresponse Description
00 01 25 01 00 00 00 00 Communication error II
01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 Card inserted
01 03 01 01 00 00 00 00 Card inserted
01 03 02 00 00 00 00 00 User pressed OK in ASK PIN
01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 User pressed OK in Mode1-Mode2Response
01 03 03 XX 00 00 00 00 Successful operation
01 03 05 06 00 00 00 00 Card inserted? Future work
01 03 07 00 00 00 00 00 User presses Cancel in ASK PIN,Mode1-Mode2
01 03 08 01 00 00 00 00 Communication error I
02 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 Unknown
02 81 01 00 00 00 00 00 Unknown
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5.2 Traces of USB traffic
In this section we will have a look at USB traffic using the USB-connected e.dentifier2.
For those data I have used several bank cards to find out extra information. The
following cards were used in order to extract information:
• RaboBank Card (Netherlands). Type: Maestro.
• JavaCard. Type: Emulating Maestro of ABN-AMRO.
• Bankia Card (Spain). Type: VISA Electron.
• NovaGalicia (Spain). Type: MasterCard.
Before the next tables some clarifications about how I have tried to show my research
must be explained a bit:
• Out: PC sends to e.dentifier2. It is called USB-command and we observe that
they always start with : 02 XX or 01 03.
• In: e.dentifier2 sends to PC. It is usually called USB-response in the tables.
• Payload: Data will be attached in the commands. Usually 00 06 ...... and ending
with 00 0X where X can be 2,3,4,5.
• XX : Variable Bytes.
• ?? : It is not sure.
• .... Snipped. Look at payload size to understand that.
• End: Possibly payloads are ending with this line, that means the end of payload.
It could be that second byte in the last 8 bytes of a USB response, that could
mean the length of payload’s data which are remaining. But this assumption is
not sure.
• Possible changes of bytes depending of Bank card type and company. Normally
in bold, and marked with MasterCard, VISA or others.
• RESPONSE1 or RESPONSE2. We have an if-else condition. Normally when the
cardholder presses OK or Cancel.
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Table 5.3: SHOW LOGO IN DISPLAY and SET LANGUAGE.
These USB instructions can be individually each other.Although they have been detected
for going together mostly of time. SHOW SHIELD IN DISPLAY is displaying the logo of
ABN-AMRO, in the screen of the e.dentifier2. In this manner, the language can be set to
English(EN) or Dutch(NL) without altering USB responses, which are always fixed for
both languages if these two USB commands are sent together. Also the USB command
SET LANGUAGE has been seen with other USB command ( SHOW INSERT PICTOGRAM) in
the JavaScript function CheckCard() of BECON.js.
This USB traffic has been detected trying to do authentication in the ABN-AMRO’s
website and in the beginning of any operation as login or transaction.
USBcommand Description
Out: 02 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 SHOW SHIELDS IN DISPLAY
Out: 00 02 6E 6C 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE NL = ascii(6E6C)
...... or ..........
00 02 65 6E 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE EN = ascii(65 6E)
USBresponse Description
In: 01 03 01 01 00 00 00 00 Response
In: 00 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 Response
• Filling means that sometimes the command fills ’XX’ with 0x20 or 0x00. De-
pending if it binary data or it is ascii text in order to display in the e.dentifier2.
• Ex: A example of trace or normal values.
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Table 5.4: GET ATR (Answer To Reset).
This USB command will ask for the ATR to smartcard and this will answer with its
ATR. The USB response will contain the ATR between third and eighth byte in the USB
response. The ATR has been marked with XX. Also we found some variations in the
last response to end the response in the second byte. It has been highlighted with bold
showing different kinds of EMV cards.
This command was detected along many operations interacting with the driver due
to its importance. Any operation with the bank requires this command previously.
USBcommand Description
Out: 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 GET ATR
USBresponse Description
24 bytes (4x8) for ATR (X)
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX 3B......
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX
In: 00 03 XX XX XX XX XX XX Ending Maestro
00 02 90 00 ... Ending VISA?
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Table 5.5: Card inserted?
This USB traffic is not clear yet. For that, we use an interrogation ’?’ in its name.
We have shown both responses depending if the card was inserted (RESPONSE1) or
not(RESPONSE2). If the card was not inserted,then we saw that a lack of 8 bytes in the
USB response. This lack are the first 8 bytes in the USB RESPONSE1, and the result of
that is RESPONSE2.
Another variation that we found was the seventh byte of USB response marked
with bold in the tables. This byte can change depending of kind of EMV card which is
inserted. Actually, we do not know why this byte is changing sometimes. Below we can
watch as this value can change without a known pattern.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 02 00 00 00 00 00 CARD INSERTED?
USBresponse Description
RESPONSE1: 2x8 bytes
In: 01 03 05 06 00 00 00 00 Card was inserted!
In: 00 06 30 31 2E 30 35 00 VISA,Maestro,Mastercard
Highlighted byte could change:32 (MasterCard)
RESPONSE2: 8 bytes
In: 00 06 30 31 2E 30 35 00 No card inserted!
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Table 5.6: SHOW INSERT CARD PICTOGRAM and SET LANGUAGE
These USB commands are very similar to SHOW SHIELD IN DISPLAY and SET LANGUAGE.
To read further information about SET LANGUAGE can be looked up at table 5.3. A language
is needed for the e.dentifier2 in order to send messages towards the smartcard. If language
bytes are set to 00 00, the e.dentifier2 will use Dutch language by default.
The difference with this command is the information displayed in the screen of e.dentifier2,
this command shows a pictogram asking for a smartcard. Identical response has been
observed in this USB traffic. Let us realize that if the smartcard is not inserted, the
e.dentifier2 will wait any smartcard to continue. The USB response is only sent after a
smartcard has been inserted.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 01 02 00 00 00 00 SHOW INSERT CARD PICTOGRAM
Out: 00 02 6E 6C 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE: NL (6E 6C)
...... or ..........
00 02 65 6E 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE: EN (65 6E)
USBresponse Description
In: 01 03 01 01 00 00 00 00 Response Card inserted 1
In: 00 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 Response Card inserted 2
Table 5.7: ??UNKNOWN.
Totally unknown for us. This USB command was detected during a login session with
ABN-AMRO’s website. A couple of bytes have been observed for their variation. The first
of them, is the fourth byte of first 8 bytes of USB response (It is highlighted with bold
and value 0B). This byte was observed with close values (0B and 0C). The other bytes
highlighted mean the length of data in the octet of USB commands. Below we also observe
as different measures with VISA, MasterCard and Maestro. The seventh byte could be
length of the payload, but this is not sure.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 03 00 00 00 00 00 ??UNKNOWN
RESPONSE: 3x8 bytes
In: 01 03 04 0B 00 00 00 00 Maestro,VISA,MasterCard can change seventh byte
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Maestro
00 05 XX XX XX XX XX XX MasterCard,VISA
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Table 5.8: TRANSACTIONS: SEND SIGNDATA-DATA.
Send data to e.dentifier2 in a transaction in order to sign. Signed data of transaction will
be attached in the payload ( Marked with XX in the table ) of the USB command. This
USB command was widely reverse engineered at Arjam Blom’s thesis [2].
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 05 16 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-DATA transaction
PAYLOAD: ??x 8bytes
Usually 4x8bytes.
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Data to send
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Data
........
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Data
Out: 00 04 XX XX XX XX XX XX End of data .Filling with 0x00
Table 5.9: LOGIN: SEND SIGNDATA-DATA.
Send data to e.dentifier2 from PC in login operations. This USB command was widely
reverse engineered at Arjam Blom’s thesis [2]. Not relevant for the attack [1].
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 05 05 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-DATA login
Table 5.10: ASK PIN
Ask for the PIN code of 4 digits to cardholder. The cardholder will enter his PIN code and
he will be able to press two options: the key ’OK’ (RESPONSE1) or ’C’(RESPONSE2).
Both USB responses are showed below.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 ASK PIN
USBresponse Description
In: 01 03 02 00 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE1: OK
In: 01 03 07 00 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE2: CANCEL
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Table 5.11: SEND SIGNDATA-TEXT
Send text from PC to e.dentifier2 to be signed in it. When a transaction occurs, first it is
sent a USB command with data of the transaction(SEND SIGNDATA-DATA-transaction),
and the next instant is sent a USB command with a text to be displayed in the e.dentifier2
(SEND SIGNDATA-TEXT). Now the cardholder can decide if he wants to authorize the
transaction, let us remember that now the cardholder is seeing the e.dentifier2’s screen and
he can understand the message sent from PC with details of transaction. This step can
be checked in more details in the Chapter 4, figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Then the cardholder
could press ’OK’ or ’C’. From here, the attack to SWYS protocol [1] started pressing OK
instead of the cardholder without waiting for a response from e.dentifier2 towards PC. In
this moment, the text disappeared in less than one second and e.dentifier2 and smartcard
created a cryptogram authorizing the transaction without the cardholder’s participation.
This cardholder’s decision, the main goal of SWYS, is only vulnerable in some millions of
old e.dentifier2.
The payload for this USB command is established to 12x8 bytes covering full screen on
the e.dentifier2. A possible payload asking for pressing ’OK’ can be this: 00 04 4F 4B
20 20 74 20. That means, the key ’OK’ is encoded in hexadecimal as 4F 4B.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 05 46 00 00 00 00 SEND SIGNDATA-TEXT
PAYLOAD: 12x8bytes aprox.
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Text to be displayed
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Text to be displayed
........
Out: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX Text. Fill 0x20 (Blank space)
Out: 00 04 XX XX XX XX 74 XX End of text
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Table 5.12: GENERATE AC
This USB command will attempt to create a cryptogram (Step 7 in the Figures 4.1,4.2
and 4.3). As we explained earlier in the background chapter, a cryptogram (Application
Cryptograms (AC)) can be an : ARQC and AAC (Check Chapter 2 for further informa-
tion). This command is sent to e.dentifier2, and this will create both cryptograms asking
to the smartcard. Those cryptograms are unpredictable because there is a function f
which is mangling data and they are proof of confirmation of an operation : transaction
or login with the bank.
Two responses have been shown bellow to observe the behavior of both e.dentifiers2 (Old
and new version). Let us look at the new e.dentifier2 how presses ’C’ itself if it detects
that the cardholder have not pressed ’OK’ yet (Steps 7-8 at Figure 4.2).
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 06 00 00 00 00 00 GENERATE CRYPTOGRAM
USBresponse Description
RESPONSE1 with old e.dentifier2
PAYLOAD: ??x8bytes
In: 01 03 03 XX 00 00 00 00 Attack WORKS.The cryptogram will be created
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX cryptogram
........
In: 00 06 XX XX XX XX XX XX cryptogram
In: 00 02 XX XX XX XX XX XX End of cryptogram: Maestro,VISA
03 MasterCard
RESPONSE2 with new e.dentifier2
PAYLOAD: 2x8bytes
In: 01 03 08 01 00 00 00 00 Attack FAILS.The cryptogram won’t be created
In: 00 01 25 01 00 00 00 00
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Table 5.13: Possible traces with GENERATE AC.
USB traces when the attack [1] works with several EMV Bank cards with old e.dentifier2.
Different USB responses have been shown when the attack works, with our emulation of
EMV-card ABN-AMRO the attack failed due to some functions that were not implemented
on the Javacard.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 06 00 00 00 00 00 GENERATE CRYPTOGRAM
In: 01 03 08 03 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE1: attack fails
In: 00 03 81 6D 00 00 00 00 Fake-card ABN
In: 01 03 03 0E 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE2: attack works VISA
PAYLOAD: 3x8 bytes
In: 00 06 80 00 0A 02 EC 2B Spanish VISA electron (Bankia)
In: 00 06 08 06 01 0A 03 A4
In: 00 02 A0 00 01 0A 03 A4 End
In: 00 06 80 00 0B 89 A5 CB Spanish VISA electron (Bankia)
In: 00 06 6B 06 01 0A 03 A4
In: 00 02 A0 00 01 0A 03 A4 End
In: 01 03 03 0F 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE3: attack works MasterCard
PAYLOAD: 3x8 bytes
In: 00 06 80 00 28 12 EA B7 Spanish MasterCard (NovaGalicia)
In: 00 06 FE 01 01 03 A4 20
In: 00 03 06 00 00 03 A4 20 End with 03
In: 01 03 03 1A 00 00 00 00 RESPONSE4: attack works Maestro
PAYLOAD: 5x8bytes
In: 00 06 04 80 01 21 68 35 Maestro (Rabobank)
In: 00 06 B5 04 1C 10 A5 00
In: 00 06 03 04 00 00 00 00
In: 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00
In: 00 02 00 FF 00 00 00 00 End
In: 00 06 04 80 01 22 90 8A RESPONSE5: attack works Maestro
In: 00 06 A1 97 1C 10 A5 00
In: 00 06 03 04 00 00 00 00
In: 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00
In: 00 02 00 FF 00 00 00 00 End
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5.3 Javascript and plugin
A costumer of Internet Banking is able to interact with USB-connected e.dentifier2
through of a web browser and a driver installed previously in his computer. Such
driver will be responsible to have a conversation between computer and Banking website
using this plugin. This driver will be able to sent USB commands to e.dentifier2 to
interact with the smartcard. Such smartcard will converse with e.dentifier2 using APDU
commands.
When a costumer visits the Banking website of ABN-AMRO using his web browser,
then a HTML embedded object called PLUGIN BECON will take care of the commu-
nication through JavaScript code asking for the device e.dentifier2 every time that
costumer performs any operation. This JavaScript program is called BECON.js and
many functions were discussed in Arjan Blom’s thesis [2]. Some functions were not
analyzed in Arjan Blom’s thesis [2] due to the fact that they are not used, but however
they exist in the JavaScript code. A little background of these functions follows and
moreover we can observe a possible output afterwards of JavaScript’s function calls.
• function BECON CheckConnection(); Checks if e.dentifier2 and smartcard
are ready to start.Moreover it checks if the driver is installed and its version and
version of plugin.
For instance, below we show a successful response (Status=0) when e.dentifier2
and smartcard are ready to create a communication: Let us observe device, driver
and plugin versions in the response as well. We have watched both versions of







• function BECON CheckCard(); Returns bankaccount and card number of
the smartcard if device and card are inserted.
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For instance, below we show a successful response(Status=0) when e.dentifier2
”ChecksCard”.Let us have a look at CardId PAN where e.dentifier2 returns Bank





• function BECON GetResponse(p sSignData); Returns a signed cryptogram
to e.dentifier2 as response. Further details at Arjan Blom’s thesis [2].





• function BECON DisplayResult(p iMessageId, p sLastLogon); It will
display last logon on e.dentifier2’s display. Not relevant for this thesis.
• function BECON Cancel(); Cancels whatever current transaction when cald-
holder presses cancel button.
• function BECON GetObject(); Returns the object’s reference.
• function BECON GetLanguage(); Returns two digits with an identifier "nl"
for Netherlands or "en" for English language).
• function BECON GetMode1Response(p sChallenge, p iCurrency, p sAmount);
Will ask the smartcard to generate a cryptogram using a challenge-response with
user’s interaction. This function could be used for signing transactions. Further
information later.
• function BECON GetMode2Response(); Will ask the smartcard to generate
a cryptogram using a challenge-response but without input parameters,it means
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no user’s interaction. This function could be used for login operations. It will
use a challenge-response between smartcard-e.dentifier2 and it will be displayed
thanks to the plugin and JavaScript.
Due to secrecy of the protocols, anything is hidden and there is no public documen-
tation. This concept of ”Security by obscurity” is very common in Internet Banking and
surely quite probably what is the main error mostly of times. The following JavaScript
functions, which it will be studied along this section, they are of unknown use. In Ar-
jan Blom’s thesis [2], these functions were not investigated. They seem to be unused.
Although we have not explicitly seen to the driver calls those functions, we have found
them out in detail how they are working.
The following JavaScript functions [6] to analyze:
• functionBECON GetMode1Response(p sChallenge, p iCurrency, p sAmount);
• function BECON GetMode2Response();
These were tools we used to achieve hidden information:
• Own HTML webpage + JavaScript BECON.js in order to launch functions to
e.dentifier2.
• RebelSim device in order to eavesdrop APDU command-response.
• USBTrace in order to intercept USB-commands.
First at all, it was found out how long parameters were to avoid input errors with the
plugin. Through of unix command ’strings’ against the driver we could obtain infor-
mation about the right length. This was important in order to interact with the plugin
to recover right data.
Secondly, our own webpage was created in order to call every function of BECON.js and
get information about how those functions work.Using the RebelSim device in order
to achieve a Man-in-the-middle between smartcard and reader and then were able to
discover raw APDUs associated to those functions. Finally RebelSim, USBTrace and
our own webpage, in this order exactly,were executed to sniff as much traffic as possible.
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Table 5.14: USB commands and responses for Getmode1-Getmode2Response
In the following table we can have a big picture of main USB commands and responses in
the e.dentifier2. Both functions share USB responses when the cardholder accepts/denies
transactions or do an authentication with bank for login operations.
Below, we can observe USB traffic that we will use later.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 07 17 00 00 00 00 GetMode1Response + 32 bytes of payload
Out: 01 03 07 01 00 00 00 00 Getmode2Response
USBresponse Description
In: 01 03 07 00 00 00 00 00 User presses Cancel
In: 01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 User presses OK
In: 01 03 08 01 00 00 00 00 Communication error
In: 00 04 R0R1R2R3R4R5R6R7 00 00 Response=R0R1R2R3R4R5R6R7
5.3.1 GetMode1Response
In this section, we have reverse engineered the JavaScript function GetMode1Response.
This function is used in USB-unconnected mode, also called as ’5.Securecode’, but it
has also been developed for Internet Banking. Nowadays this function seems unused
in USB-connected mode. This function is used to authorize payments using challenge-
response authentication protocol.
This function has a header such as:
BECON GetMode1Response(p sChallenge, p iCurrency, p sAmount)
To understand better this function, it has been marked with numbers in the diagram
to follow with next steps explained below:
1. The web browser sends to cardholder’s PC a challenge, currency and amount
following this order in this header: BECON GetMode1Response(p sChallenge,
p iCurrency, p sAmount). Web browser will check out input parameters before
sending to PC. Some values have to be between those lengths:
• Amount: 12 digits and it must be among [0000.000.000,00 - 0999.999.999,99]
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Figure 5.1: GetMode1Response diagram. - It could be used as signing transaction.
• Currency : 4 digits. It was observed that the currency icon was displayed on
the screen with different values depending on the currency code according
to the EMV specifications:
– EMV code: 0978 to use e Euros.
– EMV code: 0826 to use £ Pounds sterling.
– EMV code: 0840 to use $ Dollars.
• Challenge: 8 numeric digits.
2. The PC sends a USB command with 32 bytes of payload. Some curious findings
were the following:
• If the currency was not matched with EMV specifications, a value of 0999 1
was taken by default.
• The last byte of payload is the same that is in the amount : z10z11 (Two
last bytes in the step 2 Fig.5.1).
1 The codes assigned for transactions where no currency is involved
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A message will be displayed in the screen with details of the transaction and
cardholder will be able to decide if he wants to accept or deny the payment. In
this example, we assume that user presses ’OK’.
3. The cardholder enters his PIN code and presses ’OK’. The e.dentifier2 tries to
verify if the PIN code is right.
4. If the PIN code matches, smartcard returns ’OK’.
5. The e.dentifier2 starts to generate a cryptogram with input parameters of USB
command payload such as: GENERATE AC f(x,y,z).
6. The smartcard returns a ARQC (Authorization ReQuest Cryptogram).
7. The e.dentifier2 sends GENERATE AC f(x) in order to achieve a confirmation in
the transaction.
8. The smartcard returns an AAC (Application Authentication Cryptogram) as con-
firmation towards e.dentifier2.
9. The e.dentifier2 calculates a response with cryptograms appling a bitfilter [3,4]
and it returns a USB response that takes a confirmation (User pressed ’OK’) and
4 bytes with 8 numeric digits as response to challenge.
10. PC received this response over USB response, and now PC sends through of driver
a response to Web browser. And two parameters explaining if operation was right
or something was wrong. A status ’0’ means successful.
Note that in Figure 5.1, 5.3 there is no communication back to PC saying that
the user pressed OK. Let us remember in Chapter ”The new e.dentifier2”, that in the
attack [1] the e.dentifier2 notified a message back to PC.
38
5.3 Javascript and plugin
Figure 5.2: BECON GetMode1Response - Challenge with maximal allowed amount
sent to e.dentifier2 (Step 2 in the diagram of GetMode1Response, this picture was exactly
taken before user pressed OK).
5.3.2 GetMode2Response
In this section we are going to reverse engineer another unused function in the JavaScript
code called BECON.js. The difference with GetMode1Response is that this function
has no input parameters, so this function could be used to login with ABN-AMRO’s
website generating a signed response. Moreover, we can note a difference in USB com-
mands because are always fixed. Therefore its APDU payload is empty (The digits
”8-34-10002 are always fixed in both functions).
However, now the cardholder has not to sign any transaction, he just needs to enter
his PIN code and achieve a response in order to get authentication with the bank.
Once PIN code is verified, two cryptograms will be generated for the smartcard. Then
e.dentifier2 will calculate a response with those cryptograms.
1. The web browser uses JavaScript code to call GetMode2Response. This sends it
to PC.
2. The PC sends a USB command using e.dentifie2’s driver. The e.dentifier2, when
receives this USB command, asks for PIN code in the display.
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Table 5.15: BECON GetMode1Response (’99999999’, ’5555’,’012345678901’)
In the following table we have sent a wrong currency, directly the code 0999 is assigned
when currency is not involved. As challenge, we sent 4 bytes with a value of ’99999999 and
an amount of 6 bytes ’012345678901’. We already explained as last byte of amount was
repeated at the final of payload (It is undercored in the table bellow as well). We observe
in APDU commands, GENERATE AC, as challenge-amount-currency are sent to calculate
ARQC in the smartcard. Also we have seen in order to calculate AAC, it is only sent the
challenge. We do not know how response is generated, it must be researched with different
bit filters. Some bit filters [3,4] have been checked without success. To apply these filters,
we have used ATC (Application Transaction counter, which has not been shown in this
table) and both cryptograms: ARQC and AAC.
Javascript Input USB command APDU command: Generate AC
80AE80002B AE (generate ARQC)
01 03 07 17 00 00 00 00 01234567890100000000000000008000
Challenge=99999999 00 06 01 15 9F 37 04 99 0000000999000000009999999934
Currency=5555 00 06 99 99 99 9F 02 06 00000000000000000000010002
Amount=012345678901 00 06 01 23 45 67 89 01 80AE00001D AE (generate AAC)
00 05 5F 2A 02 55 55 01 000000000000000000005A33800000000
0999999990000000000000000
Javascript Output USB response APDU response: ARQC and AAC
00C000002B (response)
Status=0 User presses OK 9F2608 5BAA4E31F8F56A (ARQC)
StatusDescription=Success 01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 9F1012 1C10A50003040...00FF
Response=39046235 Response 00C000002B (response)
00 04 39 04 62 35 00 00 9F2608 4EFD77D8F7438B1 (AAC)
9F1012 1C10250003440...00FF
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Table 5.16: BECON GetMode1Response(’66666666’, ’0978’, ’033333333333’)
In the following table we have sent euros as Currency using its EMV code (0978).
As challenge, we sent 4 bytes with a value of ’66666666 and an amount of 6 bytes
’033333333333’. In this example, we can also have a look to last byte of the amount
because is repeated at the end of the payload ( underscored ).
This example is very similar to table 5.15. Read more specifications there.
Javascript Input USB command APDU command: Generate AC
80AE80002B AE (generate ARQC)
01 03 07 17 00 00 00 00 03333333333300000000000000008000
Challenge=66666666 00 06 01 15 9F 37 04 66 0000000978000000006666666634
Currency=0978 00 06 66 66 66 9F 02 06 00000000000000000000010002
Amount=033333333333 00 06 03 33 33 33 33 33 80AE00001D AE (generate AAC)
00 05 5F 2A 02 09 78 33 000000000000000000005A33800000000
0666666660000000000000000
Javascript Output USB response APDU response: ARQC and AAC
00C000002B (response)
Status=0 User presses OK 9F2608 61F59498685E2762 (ARQC)
StatusDescription=Success 01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 9F1012 1C10A50003040...00FF
Response=37511669 Response 00C000002B (response)
00 04 37 51 16 69 00 00 9F2608 8B4BD52036AECD3F (AAC)
9F1012 1C10250003440...00FF
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Table 5.17: Log of USB-communication during GetMode1Response method
Executing BECON GetMode1Response(’66666666’, ’0978’, ’033333333333’)
During this trace the language was not set and it was possible to observe as 2
language’s bytes remained empty. We observed that language by default is Dutch in
this case. We sent e as currency (0978) and different values to easily detect challenge’s
and amount’s bytes. Moreover you can note the two USB commands previous to
GetMode1Response as usual.
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 01 02 00 00 00 00 SHOW PICTOGRAM
Out: 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE
Out: 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 SET LANGUAGE
USBresponse Description
In: 01 03 01 01 00 00 00 00 Card’s inserted
In: 00 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 Card’s inserted
USBcommand Description
Out: 01 03 07 17 00 00 00 00 GetMode1Response + 32 byte Payload
Out: 00 06 01 15 9F 37 04 66 Challenge:1 byte= 66
Out: 00 06 66 66 66 9F 02 06 Challenge:3 bytes = 66 66 66
Out: 00 06 03 33 33 33 33 33 Amount:6 bytes 03 33 33 33 33 33
Out: 00 05 5F 2A 02 09 78 33 Currency e:2 bytes 09 78
USBresponse1 OK Description
In: 01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 User presses OK
In: 00 04 38 73 38 76 00 00 Response 38 73 38 76
Out: 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 GET ATR
In: 00 06 3B 67 00 00 29 20 APDU 3B6700002920-006F78-9000
In: 00 05 00 6F 78 90 00 20
Out: 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
USBresponse2 CANCEL Description
In: 01 03 07 00 00 00 00 00 User presses Cancel
In: 02 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 Sometimes is not in trace
In: 02 81 01 00 00 00 00 00 Sometimes is not in trace
Out: 02 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 GET ATR
In: 00 06 3B 67 00 00 29 20 APDU 3B6700002920-006F78-9000
In: 00 05 00 6F 78 90 00 20
Out: 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
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3. The e.dentifier2 lets smartcard verify PIN code.
4. The smartcard returns ’OK’ is the PIN code is correct.
5. The e.dentifier2 asks for ARQC sending GENERATE AC APDU command.
6. The smartcard generates and returns ARQC.
7. The e.dentifier2 asks for AAC sending GENERATE AC APDU command.
8. The smartcard generates and returns AAC.
9. The e.dentifier2 replies to PC sending two USB responses, first with ’OK’ and
then with the response. In this point the e.dentifier2 calculates the response from
cryptograms.
10. PC sends the response to web browser using the plugin and driver. And two
parameters explaining if operation was right or something was wrong. A status
’0’ means successful.
Figure 5.3: GetMode2Response diagram. - It could be used as login.
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Table 5.18: BECON GetMode2Response()
The following table is showing how GetMode2Response is working. This function could be
used as login in order to generate a signed response.
Javascript Input USB command APDU command: Generate AC
80AE80002B AE (generate ARQC)
00000000000000000000000000008000
0000000000000000000000000034
01 03 07 01 00 00 00 00 00000000000000000000010002
00 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 80AE00001D AE (generate AAC)
000000000000000000005A33800000000
0000000000000000000000000
Javascript Output USB response APDU response: ARQC and AAC
00C000002B (response)
Status=0 User presses OK 9F2608 3817E8EC705522AE (ARQC)
StatusDescription=Success 01 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 9F1012 1C10A50003040...00FF
Response=37435415 Response 00C000002B (response)





In this chapter, we will discuss some points which could be not researched given the
time. They could be useful for future students who want to research the e.dentifier2 or
whatever EMV-CAP smartcard reader. Actually, we encourage to start with DigiPass
850, an EMV-CAP smartcard reader of ING Direct. Also it would be interesting to
find out if more versions of e.dentifier2 are being used nowadays. A list of possible
suggestions :
For the EMV-CAP smartcard reader of ING:
• Detect baud rate for DigiPass 850.
• Find out USB traffic. We attached a web link for login. Unfortunately, I did not
have an ING account to try get information about it. We observed 6 bytes USB
commands in attempts with this weblink and using USBTrace. It was attempted
to get login in this weblink, but we did not get a special CD with additional
information to achieve our web browser interacts with DigiPass 850.
• Investigate more versions of VASCO vendor. They could use similar systems and
protocols.
For the e.dentifier2:




• Try to figure out how the function f(x,y,z) in GetMode1Response is returning
the response from cryptograms. This can be done tweaking more values as Cur-
rency,Amount and Challenge and trying out more bit filters [3,4]. The same for
GetMode2Response in the response. Some bit filters were attempted but they




In this chapter we will discuss questions so far unanswered in this document. A big ques-
tion is if ABN-AMRO was able to properly implement SWYS in the new e.dentifier2.
This question includes more subquestions than we can talk about in this chapter.
The main goal of the e.dentifier2 was and is: manage a handy and secure way
to authorize transactions for customers. This way, also known as SWYS by ABN-
AMRO, seems to be safer than the old e.dentifier2. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that SWYS is completely reliable. In this document, we have compared both ver-
sions of e.dentifier2. The new version is not vulnerable to last attack [1]. New vectors
of malware could appear in the new version in the future. In this thesis, we also
looked at unused functionalities in the USB-connected mode. The JavaScript func-
tion GetMode1Response(Challenge, Amount,Currency) does not have the problem of
sending a message to the PC when the user has pressed OK. In the function to authorize
transactions, GetMode1Response, the SWYS protocol appears to have been correctly
implemented. This means that the user is asked to authorize a transaction that can
be understandable for him. This transaction is shown in the screen of the e.dentifier2
and the user can press OK, however now this message is not ”leaked” towards the PC
as happened in the SIGN-DATA-TEXT (Only old e.dentifier2). The e.dentifier2 waits for
the user response in the smartcard reader, after asking for a PIN and immediately after
starts to generate a couple of cryptograms with GENERATE AC in order to get a response.
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7. CONCLUSION
Some questions are still without an answer:
Why does this function not have this flaw while the other does? If they are doing more
or less same operations.
Why was not it used in USB-connected mode if it was much more secure?
Possibly ABN-AMRO did not pick GetMode1Response due to the website being able to
give more information on the screen of the smartcard readers using (SIGN-DATA-TEXT).
Why is this function only available in USB-unconnected mode smartcard readers?
These questions are still a mystery and they are out side of our scope. Nevertheless,
they are still open further discussion.
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